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BUSH AND OBAMA FIGHT TERRORISTS 
OUTSIDE JUSTICE JACKSON'S TWILIGHT 
ZONE 
Afsheen John Radsan* 
George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama have used 
presidential powers in different ways . That is easy to say because 
they have occupied the Oval Office at different times . Since the 
fourth dimension of time affects the three dimensions of space, 
the signing of the same executive order is not the same act. 
Beyond that, parsing specific differences between Presidents is 
difficult. 
To explain the differences between Bush and Obama, one 
might use metaphor, formulas, facts, or some combination. One 
metaphor is to compare American Presidents to Odysseus from 
Greek legend. One formula comes from Justice Jackson's 
famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case. And one set of 
facts relates to programs that involve the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
Traveling from the abstract to the granular, my essay tries 
to show that the gap in national security practices between 
Bush's second year in office and his last year is far wider than 
the gap between Bush's last year in office and Obama's first 
year . (The shift between Bush I and Bush II is thus more radical 
than the shift between Bush II and Obama I.) As to the use of 
Predator strikes, irregular renditions, military commissions, the 
state-secrets privilege, and a label from armed conflict that 
allows long-term detention of suspected terrorists, there has 
been surprising continuity between presidential administrations. 
Obama has changed the packaging of aggressive programs more 
than their contents. 
* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. He thanks Benjamin Canine, 
Knapp Fitzsimmons and Brian Schenk for their research assistance. 
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THE METAPHOR 
Homer can help explain Bush and Obama. In epic poetry, 
Homer presented a strategy for dealing with beasts that caused 
sailors to crash into rocks by the lure of sweet song.1 Odysseus, 
following Circe's advice, ordered his crew to plug their ears with 
wax and to tie him to the mast of their ship. By limiting 
themselves in a minor way, by giving up some power, they hoped 
to prevent themselves from being captured by Sirens. The 
limitations, so they believed, led to their greater good. Odysseus, 
rather than face Sirens on his own, sought assistance from his 
crew. There was safety in numbers. 
To apply Homer, one might compare how willing President 
Bush was and how willing President Obama is to ask Congress, 
the other elected branch, to limit presidential power. To what 
extent do the two Presidents retreat from a full assertion of 
inherent powers? No matter their political parties, all Presidents 
seem to agree that there are some executive powers which do 
not permit intrusion from Congress. Presidents Bush and 
Obama, in this regard, have something in common. Congress, 
they must be sure, cannot legislate away the President 's powers 
to pardon offenders or to veto legislation. Those are two easy 
examples. 
Most observers agree that the core of presidential power 
cannot be molested. Yet profound differences emerge when 
general statements are applied at a more specific level. For each 
President, one might ask how large that impenetrable core of 
executive power really is. John Yoo, a former official in the Bush 
Justice Department, offered one description. As for the CIA's 
aggressive interrogations, Yoo said: 
Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct 
of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate 
strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as 
statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a 
certain manner or for specific goals would be 
unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the 
President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary 
to prevent attacks upon the United States.2 
1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 148-53 (Robert Squillance ed., George H. Palmer 
trans., Barnes & Noble Classics 2003). 
2. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 172, 207 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds. ,  2005) .  
2010] JUSTICE JACKSON'S TWILIGHT ZONE 553 
But John Yoo's description is not within the mainstream.3 
Perhaps he and President Bush pushed things too far. President 
Obama, for now, is not so pushy. He seems to see a smaller core 
to presidential power. 
Whether presidents agree with Professor Yoo or with his 
critics, they do not always operate in a single mode. Categories 
are purer in theory than in fact. Sometimes differences on 
executive power blur when constitutional principles are adjusted 
to circumstances beneath the clouds. The reality on the ground, 
so to speak, has affected two presidents during their journeys in 
office. 
THE BUSH JOURNEY 
During two terms in office, President Bush was not always 
extreme in his national security practices. On programs that 
related to the CIA, Bush showed two different faces. His 
expression in the first term was harsher than in the second. 
Right after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush turned to 
Congress for some support. Congress passed an Authorization 
for Use of Military Force that encouraged the President to use 
"all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."4 Later, President 
Bush claimed the AUMF justified several actions in the fight 
against terrorists. 
First, the Bush Administration said the AUMF allowed 
President Bush to detain an American citizen captured in 
Afghanistan just after 9/11. A plurality of the court agreed with 
him in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.5 Second, Bush's advocates said the 
3. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2373 
(2006) ("[T]he Constitution provides no single source for the President's various abilities 
to promulgate agency regulations, to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and to conduct 
foreign relations ."); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power 
Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 521 (2008) (arguing, inter 
alia, that executive branch precedents should not be seen as conclusive or even 
necessarily persuasive in establishing constitutionality and that executive power can be 
curbed by reforms that minimize secrecy and impose more accountability); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) ("[T]he Founders assumed that massive changes 
to the status quo required legislative enactments, not executive decrees. As that concept 
has broken down, the risks of unchecked executive power have grown to the point where 
dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity.") .  
4. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)). 
5. See 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that President had the 
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AUMF authorized the military commissions President Bush 
established by executive order in Guantanamo. The Supreme 
Court disagreed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.6 Third, the Bush 
Administration said the A UMF justified the terrorist 
surveillance program, that is, the monitoring of communications 
without seeking warrants through the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.7 This controversy did not reach the Supreme 
Court. Instead, the TSP controversy was settled through 
statutory amendments that, among other things, immunized 
telecommunications companies that assisted government 
surveillance.8 
Soon after 9/11, Congress also passed the Patriot Act9 as a 
sort of presidential wish list. As a result, it lowered the wall to 
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering. Congress allowed financial and other information to 
be collected by national security letters-basically administrative 
subpoenas. And it approved sneak and peek warrants. 
Many Bush officials said robust executive power was 
necessary to fight terrorists. Their common goal was power, but 
they disagreed on how to obtain that power as 9/11  faded into 
the country's past. One group believed President Bush should 
rely on his Article II powers, alone, flexing the Commander-in­
Chief Clause among other provisions. Another group believed 
President Bush should seek more congressional support. Mindful 
of Justice Jackson's famous categories from the Steel Seizure 
Case, this group reminded the extremists that the President's 
power is at its maximum when Article II powers are combined 
with everything Congress can delegate under Article I. For 
them, this was better politics as much as it was a better legal 
framework. They tried to shift the question from whether the 
President had the power to do something to whether the Federal 
Government did. Not all officials, of course, neatly fell into two 
right to detain, but subject to "a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for 
that detention"). 
6. See 548 U.S. 557 (2006) .  
7 .  Memorandum from the U .S .  Dep't of  Justice on  Legal Authorities Supporting 
the Activities of the Nat'l Sec. Agency Described by the President 3 (Jan. 19, 2006), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsal 1906wp. pdf ("Accordingly, 
electronic surveillance conducted by the President pursuant to the AUMF, including the 
NSA activities, is fully consistent with PISA and falls within category I of Justice 
Jackson's framework.") .  
8. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, § 102(a), 122 Stat. 2436, 2459 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1812, 
1881, 1881g, 1885, 1885c (2008)) .  
9 .  Pub. L .  No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) . 
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groups. But for the sake of illustration, I propose David 
Addington as a representative for the first group and Jack 
Goldsmith for the second group. 
Addington was Vice President Cheney's legal adviser, and 
later became Cheney's chief of staff. Addington 's tenure with 
the Bush Administration is often attributed to extending 
executive power to unprecedented levels.10 Under Addington, 
the Bush Administration was hostile to Congress and largely 
unconcerned with the Supreme Court.11 Addington himself was 
quoted as saying, "[w]e're going to push and push and push until 
some larger force makes us stop. "12 
Goldsmith was the head of the Justice Department 's Office 
of Legal Counsel for part of 2004. Opposed to Addington, 
Goldsmith advocated congressional approval of controversial 
executive actions. He called for Congress 's "explicit help" on 
detentions and military commissions.13 Goldsmith rooted his 
beliefs in Justice Jackson's articulation of executive power being 
"at its maximum" when the President acts "pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress. "14 Goldsmith saw 
congressional approval as necessary for placing counterterrorism 
policies "on a solid legal foundation."15 
From 2002 until 2006, the Bush Administration did not seek 
much from Congress or many adjustments in statutes. Letting 
things be, the Administration did not get close to a framework 
statute to cover the details in the fight against terrorists: 
detention, interrogation, transfers, and trials. For a while, 
Addington prevailed. 
Once the country's mood changed, the courts entered the 
breach. Hamdan, concerning the legality of military commissions 
at Guantanamo, was a clear setback for Addington and a 
vindication for Goldsmith. The Supreme Court held that 
commissions, established on nothing more than the President's 
10. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First 
Century: An Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 343-46 (2008) (describing the debate over 
the "Unitary Executive" theory and the Bush Administration's post-9/11 expansion of 
Presidential authority). 
11 .  JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 126 (2007) (describing 
Addington's belief that presidential power was coextensive with presidential 
responsibility). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 123. 
14. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)) .  
15. GOLDSMITH, supra note 11,  at  123. 
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November 13, 2001 order, violated the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and, by the UCMJ's link to the laws of armed conflict, 
also violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.16 It 
took the Hamdan setback in 2006 to cause the White House to 
go back to Congress with hat in hand. As a result, the Military 
Commissions Act was passed in October 2006.17 Curiously, 
Obama, as a Senator, voted against this grant of power to 
President Bush.18 The MCA was a partial framework statute, 
covering military trials and interrogation standards. Goldsmith, 
gone from the government, prevailed. The War Crimes statute 
was retroactively amended to only include "grave breaches" of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. And the 
President, in a CIA exception, was given the leeway to approve 
interrogation tactics below torture but beyond what was 
permitted to the Department of Defense and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. These tactics were outlined in 
Executive Order 13,440, issued on July 20, 2007 as well as the 
classified supplement to the executive order.19 
After that, an impatient Bush counted his final days in 
office as the country looked forward to the presidential 
transition. Easily drawn into the power of positive thinking, 
many people started to join the chant of "Yes, we can." Already 
in place for them, whether they acknowledged it or not, were 
some reasonable programs at the CIA. 
THE OBAMA JOURNEY 
To differ from Bush's journey in significant terms, Obama 
could have insisted on transparency and accountability from the 
CIA and the rest of the intelligence community. Obama could 
have steered away from the laws of armed conflict and 
abbreviated process; to please civil libertarians in his coalition, 
16. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 ("The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military 
commissions on compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also 
with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of 
the law of nations,' including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. The 
procedures that the Government has decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by commission 
violate these laws.") (citations omitted). 
17. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
18. 109 CONG. REC. Sl0,388 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi­
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page=Sl0388&position=all ("Let me take a few 
minutes to speak more broadly about the bill before [the Senate] . . . .  The problem with 
this bill is not that it is too tough on terrorists. The problem with this bill is that it is 
sloppy. And the reason it is sloppy is because we rushed it to serve political purposes 
instead of taking the time to do the job right."). 
19. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (Jul. 20, 2007). 
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he could have moved toward the criminal justice system and full 
due process for handling suspected terrorists. But, so far under 
Obama, a major shift on CIA programs has not occurred. 
Less than two years into Obama's first term, there is not as 
much to report about his executive actions. National security is 
not at the top of his agenda since the financial bailout and 
health-care reform have taken up the new administration's time. 
On CIA-related policies, President Obama has not made much 
progress on a framework statute. And he has talked less than 
President Bush about an executive override of statutes, whether 
in presidential signing statements or in other places. As one shot 
over the CIA's deck, however, he did allow Attorney General 
Eric Holder to reopen a criminal investigation about alleged 
abuses that occurred in the CIA's detention and interrogation 
program during the Bush Administration. 
For Obama, the Military Commissions Act (in an updated 
version in 2009) stands as his compass on national security.20 
Even so, Captain Obama cleared out a few things that Captain 
Bush had left on deck. On January 22, 2009, Obama closed the 
CIA's secret prisons, eliminated the CIA exception for 
interrogations, and imposed a uniform interrogation standard 
across the government.21 Yet he did these things by executive 
order rather than by statute. So if Obama changes his mind 
about secret prisons and the uniform standard, he does not need 
Congress's permission. He could make those changes in the 
stroke of a pen, a possibility hinted at in the executive order 
which states that Obama's Special Task Force, "if warranted," 
should "recommend any additional or different guidance for 
other departments or agencies. "22 
20. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § §  1801-1807, 123 
Stat. 2574 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/2009%20MCA %20Pub% 
20%20Law%20111-84.pdf; Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for 
Guantanamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1029/p02s01 -usju.htrnl ("In signing the 
National Defense Authorization Act on Wednesday, President Obama has personally 
endorsed yet another attempt by the US government to conduct military-commission 
trials of terror suspects currently held at the Guantanamo detention camp."). 
21. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
22. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and 
Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html ("The Executive Order 
directed the Task Force to study and evaluate 'whether the interrogation practices and 
techniques in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, when employed by departments and agencies 
outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary 
to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different 
guidance for other departments or agencies."'). 
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If Obama is duplicitous, he could keep any renewal of secret 
prisons and aggressive interrogations hidden from those without 
a "need to know." He might argue to himself (and to an inner 
core of advisers with security clearances) that it would hurt 
national security-by undercutting support both at home and 
abroad-if everyone knew the dirty truth of what is done for 
security. Quite charming, Obama may be better than Bush in 
hiding truth from the country. However Captain Obama steers 
the ship of state, the winds behind him will be strong when he 
combines executive prerogative with the presidential power to 
classify information. 
If President Obama were truly interested in the 
fundamentals of the country 's counterterrorism policies-things 
that would last longer than one or two presidential terms-he 
would try to lock changes into place by statute. As President, he 
could propose new legislation. Undoing statutes, of course, 
would require majority votes in Congress plus the President's 
signature, or two-thirds votes from both houses of Congress to 
override a presidential veto. To be more of an Odysseus, 
President Obama should seek more statutes. At this stage in his 
journey, the current binds do not tie him very tightly-if at all. 
On two different journeys, the Military Commissions Act 
strapped both President Bush and President Obama. Bush, who 
resisted Congress during the middle years of his presidency, did 
not seem as happy to be strapped to the ship as Obama does. 
Looks, of course, can be deceiving. President Obama's smile 
may mask duplicity on the CIA's business of espionage and 
covert action. How much you like that duplicity depends on the 
extent you believe secrecy and democracy can co-exist. 
THE FORMULA 
The facts about executive power require context to be 
meaningful. For additional insights into Bush and Obama, one 
might look back to the canon of United States Supreme Court 
cases. In the Steel Seizure Case,23 Justice Jackson acknowledged 
the lack of useful models "to concrete problems of executive 
power as they actually present themselves. "24 Instead of offering 
an analogy to ancient Greece, Jackson drew on the Old 
Testament, saying that the answers to executive power "must be 
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) . 
24. Id. at 634. 
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divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph 
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh."25 Other than that, 
Jackson suggested that the authorities on executive power, over 
the course of history, have cancelled themselves out. In place of 
metaphor (or as another metaphor), Jackson offered his three 
famous categories. Category one is when the President has 
express or implied consent from Congress. Category three is 
when Congress has expressed or implied its disagreement with 
the President. And category two is when Congress is poised 
between categories one and three. Since then, courts and 
scholars are more likely to use Jackson's categories than to apply 
analogies from ancient Greece, the Old Testament-or from 
some other source. 
Even when courts are not explicit about the Jackson 
categories, commentators use them to come back to cases about 
executive power. John Roberts, for example, stated during his 
confirmation hearings to become Chief Justice that the Jackson 
formula is best for solving problems about executive power. In 
response to Senator Feingold's question about how Roberts 
would have analyzed the President's authority to detain a United 
States citizen as an enemy combatant (an issue earlier before the 
Court in Hamdi), Roberts replied: "My understanding of the 
appropriate approach in this area is that it is the Youngstown 
analysis, the one sent forth in Justice Jackson's concurring 
opinion. And I think that is the most appropriate way to flesh 
out the issues. "26 The Hamdi decision, however, showed that 
Supreme Court Justices were less explicit about the Steel Seizure 
Case than the nominee about to join them as Chief Justice. 
Other lawyers have also forgotten Jackson's categories. One 
of the many criticisms leveled against John Yoo's analysis of the 
legality of CIA interrogations was his failure to mention 
25. Id. 
26. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
243 (2005) , available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname 
=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:23539.wais.pdf. Similarly, in response to Senator Leahy's 
inquiry as to whether the President could override a congressional ban on torture, 
Roberts stated: "there often arise issues where there's a conflict between the Legislature 
and the Executive over an exercise of Executive authority - asserted Executive authority. 
The framework for analyzing that is in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube case, the famous 
case coming out of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills." Id.at 152. When Leahy 
asked if Youngstown is settled law, Roberts responded, "I think the approach in the case 
is one that has guided the court in this area since 1954 or 1952, whatever it was . . .  
Youngstown is a very important case in a number of respects." Id.at 153. Roberts went 
on to state that Justice Jackson is one of the Justices he most admires. Id. 
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Jackson's categories .27 To many, Yoo had committed heresy . 
Only a former or current law professor, it seems, would be 
stupid enough or brave enough to disagree with the Chief Justice 
about Jackson's importance. 
It is not clear whether Yoo forgot the Jackson categories or 
chose not to apply them in his work for the Office of Legal 
Counsel . Either way, to the extent Yoo challenges the usefulness 
of these simple categories, I join him in here.sy . To me, the 
Jackson categories tend toward meaninglessness . The twilight 
zone, albeit a nice title for a television program, is not so distinct 
from categories one and three, and the poor threads to the 
categories clash with the rich tapestry of American constitutional 
law. 
JACKSON APPLIED IN HAMDI 
To analyze executive power under Bush and Obama, three 
categories may be more than necessary to the judiciary's binary 
decisions on whether or not a President can take certain actions. 
Because courts do not usually declare a tie between the parties 
to a dispute, Jackson's categories are too complicated. At the 
same time, because three categories may not be enough to 
explain all the nuances to the Constitution, Jackson's categories 
are too simplistic . Whether the categories prove too much or too 
little, judges and academics seem to indulge the Jackson 
categories for old time's sake. 
For judges, interpreting whether a statute helps or hurts the 
President is often very difficult . In Hamdi, the Steel Seizure Case 
was a looming presence. Justice O'Connor, for example, 
believed the AUMF helped President Bush and satisfied the 
Non-Detention Act: 
[I]t is of no moment that the A UMF does not use specific 
language of detention. Because detention to prevent a 
combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident 
of waging war, in permitting the use of "necessary and 
27. Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law School, Statement Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm. regarding the Nomination of the Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales as Att'y 
Gen. of the U.S. 4,7 (Jan. 7, 2005),  available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ 
pdf/KohTestimony.pdf. ("Nevertheless, in my professional opinion, the August 1, 2002 
OLC Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read . 
. . . In a stunning failure of lawyerly craft, the August 1, 2002 OLC Memorandum 
nowhere mentions the landmark Supreme Court decision in Youngstown Steel & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, where Justice Jackson's concurrence spelled out clear limits on the 
President's constitutional powers. ") .  
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appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably 
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered 
here.28 
561 
Justice Souter, by contrast in the same case, did not believe 
the A UMF was specific enough to serve as an Act of Congress to 
displace the NDA. For multiple reasons, Souter read the NDA 
"to require clear congressional authorization before any citizen 
can be placed in a cell. "29 Souter stated: 
[The] focus [of the AUMF] is clear, and that is on the use of 
military power. It is fairly read to authorize the use of armies 
and weapons, whether against other armies or individual 
terrorists. But . . . it never so much as uses the word detention, 
and there is no reason to think Congress might have 
perceived any need to augment Executive power to deal with 
dangerous citizens within the United States, given the well­
stocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses 
covering the gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to 
terrorists might commit.30 
Yes, the Jackson categories do help explain the difference 
between Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter in one case. Their 
debate in Hamdi, after all, can be reduced to a debate between 
two of the three Jackson categories. Justice O'Connor, who said 
the AUMF satisfied the requirement for congressional action in 
the NDA, put President Bush in category one. Justice Souter, on 
the other hand, said the A UMF was not specific enough to 
satisfy the NDA, putting President Bush in category three. Yet 
neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Souter was explicit about 
the Jackson category she or he applied. 
None of the Justices in Hamdi, however, placed the case in 
category two. Category two, in Hamdi or in other cases, is not so 
useful. It draws snickers from students. It reminds some of 
Johnny Cash's song about walking the line. And movie buffs 
connect the category to Marlon Brando's character in 
Apocalypse Now who dreamed to see a snail slither on the blade 
of a straight-edge razor-and survive. For many, Jackson's 
second category is not much more than colorful verbiage. 
28. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
29. Id. at 543. 
30. Id. at 547. Although Justice Souter did not believe the Court needed to go 
beyond the statutory language of the NDA and AUMF, he stated that Justice Jackson's 
Youngstown concurrence was "instructive," noting that "Presidential authority is 'at its 
lowest ebb' where the President acts contrary to congressional will. "  Id. at 552 (quoting 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-38). 
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MY TAKE ON THE CATEGORIES 
Judges and academics who use the Jackson categories tend 
to pass over the finer points Justice Jackson himself made clear. 
If President Bush or Obama is in category one, with express or 
implied authorization from Congress, that does not mean he 
always wins. Some actions are not permitted to the Federal 
Government. Judges, when "justiciable" controversies reach the 
court, must tell us which ones. Similarly, the President does not 
always lose in category three. There, his power is at its lowest 
ebb, but, as John Yoo hinted in his OLC memorandum, judges 
(and Presidents Bush and Obama) must tell us when Congress 
has gone too far. 
Jackson's intermediate category, in which it is not clear 
whether Congress is for Bush or against Obama, is of little use to 
courts in deciding cases about executive power. The decision 
about executive power, no matter the facts to the case or 
controversy, turns out to be binary for the courts: either the 
executive action is sustained or it is overruled. An equipoise in 
which Congress is neither for the President nor against him has 
theoretical importance (and perhaps academic importance), but 
it is not where cases are decided in the real world. Principled 
judges may work up through the categories to reach a result, 
category one for the President or category three against him. Or 
results-oriented judges, whether or not they are transparent in 
their written opinions, may back their decisions into the 
categories. 
Justice Stevens, in his Hamdan opinion, gives short shrift to 
the important point that the President does not always lose in 
category three. About all he has to say on this point is contained 
in a short footnote: "Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to 
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations 
that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own powers, placed 
on his powers."31 Justice Stevens, of course, stacks the deck in his 
favor by assuming a "proper exercise" of congressional power.32 
For this conclusion, he cites the Steel Seizure Case and then 
springs a trap from Hamdan's oral argument: "The Government 
31. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
637). 
32. Id. 
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does not argue otherwise. "33 But this is what the government's 
counsel actually said: 
Congress has repeatedly recognized and sanctioned [the 
authority of the executive branch to try enemy combatants by 
military commissions] . Indeed, each time Congress has 
extended the jurisdiction of the court-martials [sic], Congress 
was at pains to emphasize that that extension did not come in 
derogation of the jurisdiction of military commissions. And in 
its most recent action, Congress clearly did not operate as 
somebody who viewed the military commissions as ultra vires. 
They offered no immediate review, and no review at all for 
charges resulting in a conviction of less than 10 years. 34 
That does not mean Congress could have done anything it 
wanted in the UCMJ. There are some constitutional limits on 
congressional action. Whether for John Yoo or Justice Stevens, 
for George Bush or Barack Obama, there must be some areas of 
presidential power onto which Congress may not intrude. This, 
to repeat, is an initial premise to my essay. 
Back to my focus on the CIA, not only do I question the 
usefulness of Jackson's categories on issues of executive power, I 
challenge whether Congress is a significant check on intelligence 
activities.35 More promising as checks on the intelligence 
community are the patrolling entities within the executive 
branch: the lawyers, the inspectors general, and the review 
boards within the clandestine service. Internal checks, in other 
words, are more effective than external checks on the CIA's 
manifestations of executive power. Congress's express or implied 
approval of intelligence activities, whether by appropriations or 
by more specific statutes, is superficial compared to deeper 
trends within the executive branch. In a sort of paradox, 
however, the most important checks are the most difficult to 
measure; empirical data on the CIA's Office of General 
Counsel, the Office of Inspector General, and the Accountability 
Review Boards are thin -and often classified. This paradox 
applies to both Presidents Bush and Obama. 
So while Congress is not irrelevant, the importance of the 
congressional variable should not be overstated in the 
presidential formula. An academic's familiarity with the Jackson 
categories does not make them always relevant to reality. 
33. Id. 
34. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No . 05-184). 
35. See A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA's Office of 
General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 201 (2008). 
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Internal checks are much more important than the Jackson 
categories in understanding how Presidents Bush and Obama 
ensure that intelligence activities stay effective and legal . 
FAVORABLE TAKES ON THE CATEGORIES 
Chief Justices are not the only people who find Jackson's 
categories appropriate for analyzing executive power . The legal 
academy, for so long, has favored the categories as providing a 
useful, and to some, an ingenious method for analyzing 
complicated problems of constitutional law. As Obama (the 
constitutional law professor turned President) must know, many 
casebooks on American constitutional law �lace great emphasis 
on Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown. 6 Not only are the 
categories imposed on first and second-year law students, many 
respected scholars flock to the Jackson camp in their writings 
about executive power. They are unwilling to join the heresy. 
For various reasons, they relish the Jackson categories . Even so, 
because it is easy to shun disbelievers, they do not spend too 
much ink on something taken for granted. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, for one, argues that "[t]he Constitution 
is based on a simple vision of shared and separated powers . "37 At 
the core of this system are the Constitution's checks and 
balances. In fact, even "areas of seemingly unilateral executive 
authority must be understood as part of an overall system of 
checks and balances . "38 "For almost every major government 
action," Chemerinsky argues, "at least two branches of 
government should have to be involved. "39 Chemerinsky believes 
that, in light of this system of checks and balances, Jackson's 
categories are appropriate for analyzing the constitutionality of 
executive actions .40 Jackson's concurrence is a "[t]raditional 
36. Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 88 (2002) (citing, as examples, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 232 (2001); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 114 (2001); 
DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 917 (2d 
ed. 1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL. , CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 392 (3d ed. 1996); 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN AND GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 (14th 
ed. 2001)) . 
37. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the 
War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) . 
38. Id. at 5. Chemerinsky describes this approach to government power as "both 
simplistic and elegant." Id. 
39. Id. at 4. 
40. See id. at 5-6. 
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discussion[] of presidential power" that "recognized this basic 
constitutional framework."41 
Chemerinsky, fairer than Justice Stevens, acknowledges that 
"there are some areas where the Constitution assigns power to 
only one branch, unchecked by any other."42 Jackson's first 
category, as Chemerinsky presumes, appropriately addresses 
these areas. Chemerinsky also recognizes Jackson's second 
category, the "zone of twilight" in which the President and 
Congress may have concurrent, often uncertain authority.43 And 
the third category is a "formulation . . .  consistent with a system 
that values shared powers and checks and balances."44 
Like Chemerinsky, former Yale Law School Dean Harold 
Hongju Koh believes Jackson's framework is appropriate for 
analyzing our system of checks and balances. Koh, however, is 
even more enthusiastic than Chemerinsky in praising Jackson: 
A number of scholars have posited a theory of the "unitary 
executive," the notion that the President has independent 
power to control the executive branch and to resist 
infringements upon the prerogatives of his office. But the 
Constitution provides no single source for the President ' s  
various abilities to  promulgate agency regulations, to  exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, and to conduct foreign relations. As 
Justice Jackson famously wrote in his Youngstown 
concurrence, "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, 
depending on their disjunction . . . with those of Congress." 
The very point of a constitutional system of checks and 
balances is to separate and divide powers and to foster 
internal checks within each branch by recognizing multiple 
sources of enumerated authority operating in a number of 
different subject matter areas. The genius of Justice Jackson's  
Youngstown analysis rests in its acknowledgement of multiple 
sources of executive power, rather than implying that all 
executive actions automatically enjoy heightened deference 
because they spring from a wellspring of a completion power 
located somewhere in Article 11.4 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 4. Chemerinsky mentions the President's power to pardon. Id. 
43. Id. at 6. Chemerinsky goes on to argue that four approaches may be adopted in 
analyzing the second category, three of which stress the Constitution's system of checks 
and balances. Id. Although an interesting endeavor, his examination of the second 
category is not relevant for our purposes. Suffice to say that Chemerinsky accepts 
Jackson's concurrence as an acceptable Constitutional tool. 
44. Id. at 6. 
45. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2373 (2006). 
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From a law professor, there may be no higher praise than 
"genius" to describe an analytic framework. Happy with 
Jackson, Koh addresses the Supreme Court's decision in 
Hamdan, concluding that "Hamdan proves again that Justice 
Jackson's tripartite structure in Youngstown is sufficiently 
flexible to permit robust executive action when Congress 
genuinely approves, while constraining executive action against 
the will of Congress. "46 In simple terms, Koh seemed happy 
when George W.  Bush lost court cases about executive power. 
Similar to Koh, Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe accept 
Justice Jackson's "now-canonical categories that guide modern 
analysis of separation of powers. "47 Katyal and Tribe explain why 
Jackson's categories are appropriate for analyzing the 
President's power: 
Justice Jackson's articulation of the constitutional limits upon 
the commander-in-chief power makes good structural sense: 
Congress alone can see the problem whole; the Chief 
Executive tends to be blinded by the single-minded 
requirements of his military mission, and courts necessarily 
see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer to the 
executive 's  assumed greater knowledge and expertise, 
coupled with the executive 's  electoral legitimacy. For such 
reasons, the President should not be permitted, simply by 
donning his military garb, to do in this country what he could 
d .  1 . d 48 never o m mere y executive ress. 
Of the various presidential powers, Katyal and Tribe seem most 
concerned with the Commander-in-Chief Clause. For that subset 
of questions about executive power, they consider the Jackson 
categories ideal. "In discussing the limits of the President's 
power within these three zones," Katyal and Tribe explain, 
"Justice Jackson leveled a forceful warning against unilateral 
assertions of the commander-in-chief power in the name of 
national security."49 They continue: 
Justice Jackson read in the Constitution 's  text and design, as 
illuminated by relevant history, a prohibition against giving 
the President the unilateral power to define such a state of 
war or to act as though he had. Thus, the President 's  
commander-in-chief power is  not such an absolute as might be 
46. Id. 
47. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the 
Military Tribunals, 111  YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002). 
48. Id. at 1275. 
49. Id. at 1274. 
2010] JUSTICE JACKSON'S TWILIGHT ZONE 
implied from that office in a militaristic system but is subject 
to limitations consistent with a constitutional Republic whose 
law and policy-making branch is a representative Congress . . .  
. No penance would ever expiate the sin against free 
government of holding that a President can escape control of 
executive powers by law through assuming his military role. 50 
567 
With an implicit emphasis on Jackson's third category, Katya! 
and Tribe praise Jackson's framework for illustrating the 
inherent danger in a President's claim to unbridled power from 
Commander-in-Chief authority during times of actual or 
imagined military conflict.51 Centuries after the Constitution's 
ratification, they are less concerned about a system that might 
not give a President-call him Bush or Obama-enough power 
to protect the nation's security. In so many words, they favor 
Goldsmith over Addington in the debates that existed during the 
Bush Administration about executive power. They, too, were 
happy when a Republican President lost in court. 
Not everyone else who embraces the Jackson categories can 
be named here.52 Our space is small. Suffice to say that the 
academics climb over each other in heaping praise on dear 
Jackson. Repetition makes them all happy. 
Besides Jackson's proponents, one can identify a separate 
group of agnostics who accept Jackson's categories as settled 
law. In fact, the majority of scholars may actually fall into this 
50. Id. at 1274-75. 
51. In explaining congressional checks on the President's control of military 
matters, Justice Jackson stated: "There are indications that the Constitution did not 
contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him 
also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no 
monopoly of 'war powers, '  whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the 
President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army 
or navy to command. It is also empowered to make rules for the 'Government and 
Regulation of land and naval forces,' by which it may to some unknown extent impinge 
upon even command functions." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44. 
52. See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 373, 410 (2002) (" [T]he concurrence might be the most lucid, 
straightforward exposition on the remarkable dearth of very clear and useful legal 
authority which applies to concrete issues that involve executive power as the questions 
manifest themselves in practice.") ; Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential 
War Power: Examining the Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 165, 173 (2009) ("Scholars agree . . .  that Justice Jackson's tripartite 
framework is one of the most resilient and workable frameworks to evaluate the 
constitutionality of executive actions.") ; Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial 
Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 202 (Peter 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds. ,  1996) (" [The concurrence is] the most truly intellectually 
satisfying . . .  opinion in our two-hundred-year constitutional history.") ; ABRAHAM D. 
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 382 
n.18 (1976) (describing Justice Jackson's opinion as "deservedly famous") . 
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category.53 Yet, in taking the categories at face value, they offer 
at least tacit approval of Jackson's framework.54 Because they 
tend to accept the framework by a simple citation to Jackson's 
concurrence, their statements add little to the debate. The ones 
who contest the usefulness of Jackson's categories, different 
from true believers and agnostics, are an isolated minority. 
MORE UNFAVORABLE TAKES 
Not all scholars, however, are quite so enamored with 
Jackson's categories. Before me, a few brave voices criticized the 
three categories and called into question Jackson's exalted 
status. An early dissenter in the academy was Edward Corwin, 
who challenged both the majority and concurring decisions in 
the Steel Seizure Case. Corwin concluded that "Justice Jackson's 
rather desultory ·opinion contains little that is of direct 
pertinence to the constitutional issue. "55 Summarizing the 
concurring opinions, Corwin said they did not "contribute 
anything to the decision's claim to be regarded seriously as a 
doctrine of constitutional law."56 This, in conjunction with his 
view of the majority opinion as "a purely arbitrary construct 
created out of hand for the purpose of disposing of this 
particular case, and . . . altogether devoid of historical 
verification," led Corwin to predict that "Youngstown will 
probably go down in history as an outstanding example of the sic 
volo, sic jubeo57 frame of mind into which the Court is 
occasionally maneuvered by the public context of the case 
53. Chemerinsky, best understood, may fall into this category since he does not go 
out of his way to describe why he favors Jackson's approach over other approaches. In 
the Teacher's Manual to the third edition of his casebook, he is more candid than 
elsewhere: "Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis of presidential power is very famous and 
very frequently cited, but I've never found it terribly helpful."  
54. See, e.g. , Sapna Desai, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State 
Divestment Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 702 (2009) (relying upon Jackson's 
categories in analysis) ; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 94-96 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in 
Youngstown "has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent 
powers.") ; Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth 
Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1479 (2009) ("Jackson's three-part 
framework from his concurrence in Youngstown . . .  has long been used to assess whether 
a President's activities in the national security arena are permissible.") ; Kevin M. Stack, 
The Reviewability of the President's Statutory Powers, 62 V AND. L. REV. 1171, n.3 (2009) 
("The Supreme Court has embraced Justice Jackson's framework as the grounding 
structure for review of the President's actions.") . 
55. Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 63 (1953). 
56. Id. at 64. 
57. Translating to "I want this, I order this." In other words: "arbitrary." 
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before it. "58 Although Corwin should be applauded for taking on 
the Court, it cannot be said more than fifty years later that 
Jackson's concurrence has been written off as an arbitrary 
product with no useful guidance on constitutional law. That 
prediction Corwin got wrong. Today many people-judges, 
academics, and others-use Jackson to understand presidential 
power. The substance of Corwin's critique, however, is still solid. 
Modern commentators who criticize Jackson's tripartite 
scheme argue, as I have, that the framework is far too simple. 
Saby Ghoshray, for example, says that Jackson's system "would 
have worked perfectly had the Constitution been of straight­
forward Newtonian design. Under this framework, the three 
discrete scenarios of Justice Jackson would neatly fit within the 
conceptualized framework with its carefully balanced counter 
forces combating the forces, along the way providing bullet 
proof checks and balances."59 But constitutional law is not so 
neat. As Ghoshray and many others know, it is rife with 
"uncertainties and complexities,"60 "continuously shaping, 
evolving, and structuring based on the existing circumstances. "61 
In sum, while Jackson' categories are easy to work with, they are 
of limited value for understanding a complex, non-linear system 
with more than three basic patterns.62 The categories have even 
less to say about the CIA under Presidents Bush and Obama. 
Another criticism of Jackson is that, contrary to assertions 
from Chemerinsky, Koh, and others, a framework by which 
Congress can increase and decrease the President's power 
through its own action or inaction undermines our system of 
checks and balances.63 Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar 
explain: 
Justice Jackson's assumption that the executive branch's  
power may be either augmented or decreased by 
congressional addition or subtraction -a type of 
congressional additur and remittitur-is valid in the narrow 
sense that if Congress has exercised its legislative power 
directing or authorizing implementation or enforcement, the 
President is expressly obligated by Article II to "execute" 
58. Corwin, supra note 55 at 64. 
59. Ghoshray, supra note 52, at 205. 
60. Id. at 211 .  
61 .  Id. at 205-06. 
62. Id. at 205. 
63. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need 
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 485-86 
(1991) .  Redish and Cisar refer to this theory as Jackson's "cumulative effects theory." Id. 
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those laws, a power to act that the President would lack in the 
absence of such legislation. Beyond that limited usage, 
however, Justice Jackson' s  "cumulative effects" theory makes 
neither textual nor theoretical sense.64 
To the chagrin of Redish and Cisar, Jackson would place a 
situation in the first category even if the President's power under 
Article II is questionable but Congress infuses the President with 
some of its own Article I power.65 Even if Congress delegated 
this power voluntarily, "such an approach effectively destroys 
the 'separation' of branch powers: One branch would be 
exercising power clearly marked for another branch. "66 
Redish and Cisar acknowledge that "[i]t might be argued . . .  
that as long as Congress has voluntarily chosen to convey its 
power to the executive branch (an assumption of Justice 
Jackson 's first category), no separation of powers violation has 
occurred."67 Congress, the argument goes, has essentially waived 
its right to argue that a violation has occurred.68 In response, 
Redish and Cisar argue: 
But both theoretically and practically, this waiver analysis is 
unacceptable. From the perspective of American political 
theory, the concept of congressional waiver ignores the fact 
that separation of powers protections were not inserted to 
protect the other branches, but rather to protect the populace. 
Thus, just as a litigant is not permitted to waive limitations on 
a court 's  subject-matter jurisdiction because such limitations 
are imposed to protect the system rather than the litigant, so 
too should Congress not be authorized to waive systemic 
protections of the electorate. From a practical perspective, the 
waiver theory ignores the obvious possibility that Congress 
may be controlled by the same party as the executive branch, 
effectively reducing Congress 's  check on the President. In 
such a situation, the only means of assuring the prevention of 
branch usurpation is by judicial enforcement of separation of 
69 powers. 
Even if other scholars have forgotten the people, Redish 
and Cisar remind us that we are the Constitution's ultimate 
power. Concerning the CIA and many other programs, we have 
voice in the Preamble, the Tenth Amendment, and in many 
64. Id. at 486. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 486-87. 
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other places. Redish and Cisar, to repeat, are concerned about a 
situation in which the same political party controls the 
presidency and Congress. They saw the possibility of a 
triumvirate-call them Obama, Reid, and Pelosi-which is more 
important and perhaps more dangerous than Jackson's three 
categories. 
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS 
If metaphor and formula fail to provide a complete picture 
of executive power under Bush and Obama, one can opt for 
granular detail from newspapers and magazines. Although 
Obama promised a clean break with Bush's national security 
practices, not all that much has changed. On those policies that 
relate to the CIA, Obama has repackaged Bush/Cheney policies, 
adding different bows and ribbons around the contents inside. 
To the dismay of supporters who expected him to be a civil 
libertarian in all aspects of the fight against terrorists, President 
Obama has often dealt with suspected terrorists through 
something other than the criminal justice system's full due­
process model. Whether or not Obama uses the rhetoric of war, 
it is only the laws of armed conflict that explain and justify many 
of his programs. 
PREDATOR STRIKES 
During the presidential campaign, to balance his apparent 
softness in calling for an American withdrawal from Iraq, 
Senator Obama signaled that he would be tougher than his 
Republican opponent in going after terrorists in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.70 This is a promise President Obama has kept. To the 
human rights community's chagrin, Obama has increased 
Predator strikes on al-Qaeda and on Taliban targets in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.71 
Although President Obama uses the phrase "war on terror" 
less than President Bush did, the new President has outdone the 
70. Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., Obama Emphasizes Multilateral U.S. Foreign 
Policymaking, AMERICA.GOV, Jul. 25, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/ 
2008/July/20080725162819dmslahrellek0.840069.html ("In the struggle against 
international terrorism, Obama said the focus of U.S. security efforts must be 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he says al- Qaida's 'roots run deepest."'). 
71. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009 at 36 
("During his first nine and a half months in office, [Obama] has authorized as many 
CJ.A. aerial attacks in Pakistan as George W. Bush did in his final three years in 
office.") .  
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prior President on this very aggressive program. Whether the 
Predator strikes come from the Air Force or the CIA, they can 
only be justified under international law if the United States is in 
armed conflict or acting in self-defense against the non-state 
targets. Harold Koh, having left Yale to join the Obama 
Administration, conceded both these points in a March 2010 
address to the American Society of International Law. The 
criminal justice system does not tolerate this kind of killing. 
Predator strikes under Obama have accompanied more 
American troops on the ground in Afghanistan. The United 
States, to be sure, is not at war with the governments in either 
Afghanistan or Pakistan. Both those governments, somewhere 
between armed conflict and law enforcement, are trying to root 
out at least some parts of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in their 
countries. The Afghan Taliban, of course, may not be the same 
force as the Pakistani Taliban, which explains why the Afghan 
and Pakistani governments differ in their assessments of the 
threat from the two groups. 
Whether the United States is clearing Predator strikes with 
the Afghan and Pakistani governments is not clear. The 
clearances, different from public statements after an attack, may 
come from the foreign governments through private channels. 
But if the United States is not seeking any clearance, these 
strikes are arguably violations of state sovereignty-and 
international law. 
Missile strikes from the sky complicate gunfights on the 
ground. The pilots who guide the Predators through remote­
control should be using multiple sources of intelligence before 
firing missiles against suspected terrorists. Although some critics 
have questioned how accurately the pilots distinguish 
combatants from civilians,72 very few have directly challenged 
the legality of what has become "Obama's war." Democrats in 
Congress seem less concerned about possible violations of 
international law if their White House is committing them. That 
is another fact of politics. 
72. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004-2009 26 (Norte Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l501144 ("The U.S. cannot distinguish between civilians and 
combatants with the reasonable [certainty] demanded by the principle of distinction. Nor 
has the U.S. apparently taken the necessary precautions to protect civilian lives."). 
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RENDITION 
Fewer than six months into office, President Obama 
announced that the rendition program would continue.73 This 
program, started even before President Bush, involves the 
transfer of suspected terrorists between jurisdictions without 
complying with the elaborate procedures of extradition. So, on 
rendition, Obama has chosen something other than full 
transparency and accountability for the CIA. 
Leon Panetta, toward the end of his confirmation hearing to 
become Obama's CIA Director, signaled for the new President 
that rendition would not be closed down.74 Even before the 
President's announcement, however, Panetta's signal caused a 
strong negative reaction from the human rights community.75 To 
placate the civil libertarians, President Obama promised more 
oversight on the rendition program. Obama's State Department 
may play a larger role in negotiating assurances of proper 
treatment of suspected terrorists from the receiving countries. 
And outside observers including the International Committee of 
the Red Cross may be brought in as monitors after transfer. 
The checks and controls on the rendition program come 
through executive orders and directives, not by statutes. On 
rendition, President Obama is not interested in tying himself to 
the mast of any ship. He is not interested in pursuing an idea 
Vice President Eiden proposed back in the Senate: a statute 
from Congress to bring in a judicial check on renditions. In 2007, 
Senator Biden proposed the National Security with Justice Act 
73. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on National 
Security, (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-by-the-President-On-N ational-Security-5-21-09/. 
74. See Mark Mazzetti, Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some C.I. A. 
Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/02/06/us/ politics/06cia.html ("Mr. Panetta also said the agency would continue the 
Bush Administration practice of 'rendition' . . . .  But he said the agency would refuse to 
deliver a suspect into the hands of a country known for torture or other actions 'that 
violate our human values ."') . Earlier in the hearing, CIA Director Panetta stated that the 
Obama Administration would not continue the program "because, under the executive 
order issued by the [P]resident, that kind of extraordinary rendition, where we send 
someone for the purposes of torture or for actions by another country that violate our 
human values, that has been forbidden by the executive order." Newshour with Jim 
Lehrer: CIA Nominee Panetta May Face Overhaul of Counterterrorism Measures (PBS 
television broadcast Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/ 
jan-june09/cia_02-05.html. 
75. See, e.g. Kenneth Roth, A Letter to CIA Director Panetta Regarding Diplomatic 
Assurances Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/ 
2009/02/26/letter-cia-director-panetta-regarding-diplomatic-assurances-policy ("We . . .  
ask that you entirely disavow the practice of rendition to torture, both as it was carried 
out during the Bush Administration, and as it was carried out in previous years.") .  
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by which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court would, 
in secret, review executive determinations about whether a 
"substantial likelihood" exists for believing the transfer would 
lead to torture.76 Perhaps now that a Democrat runs the White 
House, a check on rendition from the judicial branch is no longer 
necessary. Or it may be a simple matter of packaging; because 
Obama is friendlier than Cheney, the American people and the 
international community may be more willing to accept Obama's 
practices on the dark side. For any White House, marketing 
matters. 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
President Bush proposed military commissions as an 
exception to criminal justice for handling the trials of suspected 
terrorists. President Obama, again to the disappointment of his 
civil libertarian base, hinted at more stuff from the dark side. In 
a May 2009 speech, President Obama stated that "whenever 
feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal 
laws . . . . Our courts and our juries, our citizens, are tough 
enough to convict terrorists . . . .  [D ]etainees who violate the laws 
of war . . . are . . . best tried through military commissions. "77 
Now the hints of the "yes-but"  rhetoric have become truth. 
The Obama Administration will use military commissions, 
modified and arguably improved from Guantanamo, to handle 
some terrorists. They have announced that they will use a 
military commission, for example, on the alleged plotter of the 
Cole bombing in Yemen, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.78 On the 
other hand, Obama's Justice Department said it would handle 
the alleged 9/11 plotter, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), in 
federal court in the Southern District of New York.79 To those 
76. National Security with Justice Act, S. 1876, llOth Cong. § 104(a)(5) (2007), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=llO_cong_bills& 
docid=f:s 187 6is. txt. pdf. 
77. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 
21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the­
President-On-N ational-Security-5-21-09/. 
78. Charlie Savage, Trial Without Major Witness Will Test Tribunal System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/ 
us/Olcole.html?_r=l ("Mr. Nashiri's case will be the marquee test of a new tribunal 
system designed to handle terrorism suspects.") .  
79.  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try A vowed 9111 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/ll/14/us/14terror.html ("The Obama Administration said Friday that it would 
prosecute Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the Sept. 11 
attacks, in a Manhattan federal courtroom.") .  
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outside the White House, the rhyme and reason to President 
Obama's decisions on who gets military justice and who gets 
civilian justice are not so apparent. Politics are again at play. 
Further, and more to the point of executive power, the 
Obama Administration still relies on the enemy-combatant 
category to justify military trials and the long-term detention of 
some suspected terrorists. The Obama Administration, merely 
changing labels under the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 
calls these unfortunate souls "unprivileged enemy belligerents." 
While the Bush Administration defined an "unlawful enemy 
combatant" as someone who supported the Taliban or al-Qaeda, 
the Obama Administration has modified its stance in litigation 
to speak of "substantial" support.80 Adding an adjective makes a 
difference on some cases, but, in an area where the President 
retains ample discretion, the tweaking is not substantial change. 
For some fronts in Obama's counterterrorism, the framework is 
far more war than peace. The new Military Commissions Act 
applies to those non-U.S. citizens who have engaged in 
"hostilities" against the United States ; have "purposely and 
materially" supported those hostilities ; or have joined al­
Qaeda.81 Obama, like Bush, believes that membership in "al­
Qaeda" is something that lends itself to meaningful definition. 
Worse, President Obama did not make his self-imposed 
deadline of closing Guantanamo as a detention center within a 
year. Closing Guantanamo, it seems, is easier said than done. By 
the time of the presidential transition, George Bush, Barack 
Obama, and the vanquished candidate, John McCain, all agreed 
that Guantanamo needed to be closed. The mess, of course, was 
in the details. Despite Obama's charm and the new-found 
willingness of countries to help the United States, not all 
Guantanamo detainees can be transferred from United States 
control in the snap of fingers. Nor can all those leftover in 
Guantanamo easily be tried. As to the trial option, the 
intelligence community knows transparent justice runs counter 
to protecting legitimate intelligence sources and methods. The 
80. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 
Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov I opal documen ts/memo-re-det-auth. pdf. 
81.  Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-1807, 123 Stat. 
2574, 2575 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/2009%20MCA %20Pub% 
20%20Law%20111-84.pdf ("The term 'unprivileged enemy belligerent' means an 
individual . . . who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners.") .  
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heads of the various intelligence agencies are reminding 
President Obama of this. Moreover, transferring suspected 
terrorists to United States territory is a political gamble. Rahm 
Emanuel, the President's chief of staff, knows that too. 
Again, to the chagrin of civil libertarians, President Obama 
is considering indefinite detention for those Guantanamo 
detainees not easily handled by trial. Whether or not President 
Obama finds the Jackson categories useful, he does not believe 
he needs any additional support from Congress to justify this 
detention. The former law professor hints that the A UMF plus 
his presidential powers already provide him solid ground. So if 
the trial of either al-Nashiri or KSM somehow results in a not­
guilty verdict, the Obama Administration will be tempted to 
hold them as captured belligerents for the duration of American 
hostilities with al-Qaeda. That said, if President Obama transfers 
any Guantanamo leftovers to United States territory, he may 
actually seek congressional support. Continuing to hold them in 
Cuba is one thing. Holding them in Illinois is quite another. 
STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
By this point in the journey it should come as no surprise 
that President Obama, much like Captain Bush on his own ship, 
also favors assertions of the state-secrets privilege as another 
area of robust executive power. Obama's cabinet heads have not 
shied away from asserting this privilege to protect sensitive 
military, diplomatic, and intelligence information when the 
United States is a party to a lawsuit or when the United States 
intervenes in the lawsuit. The state-secrets privilege is just one of 
several presidential prerogatives to keep things out of the public 
spotlight. Other privileges include the right to classify and the 
executive privilege to protect the confidences of those who 
advise the President. 
The Obama Administration, for example, continues to 
assert the state-secrets privilege in a case in which a Boeing 
subsidiary is being sued for its alleged role in the rendition 
program.82 In Jeppesen, five non-U.S. citizens brought suit under 
the Alien Tort Statute against Jeppesen Dataplan for providing 
logistical and other services to the aircraft and the crews the CIA 
allegedly used in transferring them within the rendition 
program.83 A panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
82. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 579 F.3d 943 953-58 (9th Cir. 2009). 
83. Id. at 951 .  
2010] JUSTICE JA CKSON'S TWILIGHT ZONE 577 
government's broad assertion of the state-secrets privilege as to 
the "very subject matter" of the case, holding that the 
government needed to conduct an item-by-item inventory of the 
information to which the privilege applied.84 The appellate court 
remanded to the district court for that inventory and for a 
determination that the objected to evidence was essential to a 
prima facie case.85 Before the remand, the Ninth Circuit took this 
case up en bane and heard oral arguments in December 2009.86 
The challenge against Boeing's subsidiary has gone farther 
than Khaled el-Masri's lawsuit which alleged the CIA wrongfully 
snatched him in Macedonia and then transferred him to 
Afghanistan for harsh interrogation. In the Eastern District of 
Virginia, Judge Ellis accepted the government's broad assertion 
of the state-secrets privilege in the el-Masri case, and the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed.87 
Again, on state secrets President Obama has not sought to 
involve Congress. Rather than support any congressional bills to 
reform the privilege, the Obama Administration offered its own 
reforms through a new Justice Department policy on September 
23, 2009.88 Under this policy, heads of agencies are to assert the 
privilege only in cases of "significant harm" to national security . 
This is an executive &loss on the Supreme Court decision, United 
States v. Reynolds,8 which first recognized the state-secrets 
privilege. In that case, the head of any executive agency could 
assert the privilege based on personal review of the facts. The 
new Obama policy, adding some internal checks, sets up the 
State Secrets Review Committee to coordinate assertions of the 
privilege and requires the Attorney General to review all 
proposed assertions. 
President Obama's maneuver on state secrets avoids a 
difficult constitutional issue. If he and Congress were to pass 
84. Id. at 955-58. 
85. Id. at 962. 
86. Bob Egelko, Torture Suit Too Hot to be Heard, U.S. Says, S.F. CHRONICLE, 
Dec. 16, 2009, at C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ 
c/a/2009/12/16/BA6H1B4L3P.DTL (" 'The [Jeppesen] case cannot proceed without 
getting into state secrets,' Justice Department lawyer Douglas Letter told an 11-judge 
panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.") .  
87. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 296 
(4th Cir. 2007) ("[T]here is no doubt that the state secrets privilege is validly asserted 
here.") .  
88 .  Press Release, U.S .  Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General 
Establishes New State Secrets Policies and Procedures (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov I opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013 .html. 
89. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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legislation that reformed the state-secrets privilege, they would 
have to determine the underlying basis to the Reynolds decision. 
If the basis is common law, there is ample room for statutory 
refinement. But if the basis to the decision is the President's 
inherent power, there is much less room in what Justice Jackson 
calls his third category. An amendment to the Constitution 
would be necessary . 
President Obama's approach on state secrets, just as his 
approach to Predator strikes and renditions, does not seem 
unreasonable to me. In my view, the use of the state-secrets 
privilege does not require an overhaul. Between Bush and 
Obama, the three branches continue to work toward equilibrium 
in this area of national security law. 
OTHER DECISIONS 
The lack of total transparency about CIA activities 
disappoints Obama's supporters who expected a radical shift 
toward open government under the new President . One should 
be careful, however, not to overstate that everything has stayed 
the same for the CIA under Obama. Packaging and nuances do 
matter. And there were even a few victories for civil libertarians . 
Civil libertarians must be happy with Obama's new 
executive orders which say on close calls about classification, 
executive officials should lean toward disclosure. One order 
states: "If there is significant doubt about the need to classify 
information, it shall not be classified.90 Another order directs 
disclosure of presidential records unless specific materials are 
identified which "may raise a substantial question of executive 
privilege ."91 The revoked Bush executive order, by contrast, 
instructed executive officials to err toward non-disclosure: 
President may assert any constitutionally based privileges . . .  
[which] subsume privileges for records that reflect: military, 
diplomatic, or national security secrets (the state secrets 
privilege); communications of the President or his advisors 
(the presidential communications privilege); legal advice or 
legal work (the attorney-client or attorney work product 
privileges); and the deliberative processes of the President or 
90. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
91. See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1712.pdf (titling the pertinent disclosure 
section as "Notice of Intent to Disclose Presidential Records"). 
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his advisors (the deliberative process privilege ) .92 
Plus, Obama seems more willing than Bush to declassify 
documents. This transparency, of course, relates to abuses and 
perceived abuses from the prior Administration. Obama, in fact, 
may be less willing to declassify his own programs. In any event, 
Obama's supporters must be happy with the level of detail 
released to the public in the 2005 Office of Legal Counsel 
memoranda on CIA interrogations and in the 2004 Special 
Review by the CIA's Inspector General into Counterterrorism 
Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-
0ctober 2003).93 These reports catalogued the CIA's harsh 
tactics on suspected terrorists, some approved, some not: 
cramped boxes with caterpillars, sleep deprivation, 
waterboarding, cold-celling, stress positions, threats of sexual 
assault or death of family members, the buzzing of a power drill, 
cigar smoke, dousing with cold water, and a mock execution. 
Before this, the Bush Administration had completely withheld 
the 2005 OLC memos, and presented only a heavily redacted 
version of the IG report in response to Freedom of Information 
Act requests. President Obama, by contrast, has shined some 
light on the dark side. 
In another victory for civil libertarians, the Obama 
Administration decided in February 2009 to transfer Ali Saleh 
Kahlah al-Marri back to the criminal justice system.94 At the 
change in presidential administrations, al-Marri's case was 
pending in the Supreme Court, waiting for the Government 's 
brief. Before the case reached the high court, al-Marri (a Qatari 
in legal residence with his family in Peoria, Illinois) was arrested 
as a "material witness" in the 9/11 investigations. Next, a grand 
jury charged him with credit card fraud, among other crimes. 
Then, in a surprise to the public, the Bush Administration 
92. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_register&docid= 
fr05no01-104.pdf (citing the strong presumption for non-disclosure decided in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)) .  
93 .  Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Records Show Strict Rules for CI.A. 
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/26/us/26prison.html ("The first news reports this week about hundreds of pages 
of newly released documents on the C.l.A. program focused on aberrations in the field: 
threats of execution by handgun or assault by power drill; a prisoner lifted off the ground 
by his arms, which were tied behind his back; another detainee repeatedly knocked out 
with pressure applied to the carotid artery.") .  
94. See Carrie Johnson, Terrorism Suspect Headed to U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 
28, 2009, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/02/27 I AR2009022701692.html. 
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transferred him to a military brig in Charleston, South Carolina . 
Under President Bush, the government's explanation for holding 
al-Marri in a military brig was that he was an enemy combatant 
feared to be part of an al-Qaeda cell. 
Under President Bush, the reason for transferring al-Marri 
from the criminal justice system to the military brig was not 
clear . The evidence to prove the criminal case beyond a 
reasonable doubt may not have been there. Or intelligence 
sources and methods needed protection . Or indefinite detention 
was preferred to a fixed sentence. Whatever Bush's reason for 
the transfer out of the criminal justice system, the Obama 
Administration negotiated a plea with al-Marri, rather than push 
the Bush Administration's broad theory of executive power in 
the case of a person arrested, without a gun, far from a 
conventional battlefield. Al-Marri was therefore transferred 
back to the custody of the Attorney General, and his guilty plea 
mooted an important test of executive power in the Supreme 
Court.95 
In al-Marri's case, Obama showed self-control like 
Odysseus . The plea bargain with al-Marri allowed the Qatari to 
be removed from our country on the solid pillars of criminal law 
and immigration law. Although these two pillars also cause 
concerns for civil libertarians, they are not as controversial as 
presidential power to hold people for the duration of a long, 
shadow war . 
Obama's retreat on al-Marri leaves the Hamdi decision as 
the Supreme Court's most recent precedent on the President's 
authority to detain enemy combatants . A plurality of the Court, 
along with Justice Thomas, agreed that the AUMF passed after 
9/11 gave President Bush the authority to detain a United States 
citizen captured in Afghanistan in late 2001. President Obama 
did not press any further . A newly constituted Court might have 
backtracked from Hamdi. 
95 . Memorandum from President Barack Obama, on Transfer of Detainee to 
Control of the Att'y Gen. (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_ office/Transfer-of-Detainee-to-Control-of-the-Attorney-General ("Accordingly, 
by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States, I hereby direct [the Secretary of Defense] to transfer Mr. al-Marri to the control 
of the Attorney General upon the Attorney General's request.");  Terror Suspect Al­
Marri Pleads Guilty, CBS NEWS, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2009/04/30/national/main4981776.shtml ("Ali al-Marri, 43, admitted to one 
count of conspiring to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization."). 
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Even the author of the Hamdi opinion, Justice O'Connor, 
understood that the foundation to the President's authority 
concerning an al-Qaeda partisan was not rock solid. "Certainly, 
we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of 
interrogation is not authorized," she said.96 Relying on 
"longstanding law-of-war principles," she argued that "[t]he 
purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from 
returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again. "97 
But she acknowledged that her understanding could fall apart 
"[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely 
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of 
the law of war. "98 
Al-Marri's case was tougher than Hamdi's. Obama and his 
advisers saw that. Wiser than Bush, Cheney, Addington, and 
company, Obama did not push to the point of backfire. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Odysseus and the Jackson categories are useful as 
metaphors, they obscure the basic point that the White House 
has more power on CIA programs when the President smiles. 
President Obama-in carrying out an aggressive use of Predator 
strikes, irregular renditions, military commissions, the state­
secrets privilege, and long-term detention -understands this 
point about the dark side to presidential power. Across the 
executive branch, Obama's smile has replaced Cheney's scowl. 
96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
97. Id. at 518. 
98. Id. at 520. 
